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Who will own the EU – the Superrich
o r the People of Euro p e ?
"We can either have democracy in this country
or we can have great wealth concentrated in the
hands of a few,
but we can't have both." 
Louis Brandeis, U.S. Supreme Court Justice
(1856-1941)
It is quite remarkable that the Left so far has not
issued ‘wealth reports’ of its own. The institutions of
wealth management have done it, investigative jour-
nalists and some isolated social scientists have done
it. But the political left has honoured the rich by lar-
gely ignoring them, in spite of the fact that the num-
ber of billionaires has been exploding and that their
clandestine influence on government, political par-
ties and parliaments, on the media and on culture,
the arts and even the sports has grown at a frigh-
tening pace.
By focusing on the superrich the question of ‘who will
own the EU?’ must be addressed on various levels.1
First of all, it is a matter of assessing the extent of
wealth concentration in Europe. The rich have become
richer and for this we have a vast amount of empirical
and statistical indicators. Secondly there are the theore-
tical problems of class analysis. Is a new ruling class
based on these accumulation processes evolving in
Europe? Thirdly we have to ask whether we are entering
a new epoch or societal formation based on a quite uni-
que mix of novel accumulation processes. We have
experimentally proposed the concept of capitalism-
based high-tech-refeudalisation for this period.2
Our focus centres on the second level: ‚who does
what (to whom)?’. We hold that postulating a European
‘ruling class’ is premature. We will try to describe the
actors and profiteers of capitalism-based high-tech-
refeudalisation of Europe in terms of a complex net-
work of cooperating and competing elites.3 And we will
use a new term to describe their networks: ‘monetary
power complex’.
These networks of the ‚monetary power complex’ are
inhabited by very different groups, all per se interesting:
old, inherited wealth; old and new European ari-
stocracy; the new rich (the innovators in technology,
finance and marketing); oligarchs risen from corrupt
privatisation practices; Mafia-billionaires etc. 
The superrich and the ‚monetary
power complex’
On one hand, a network composed of groups and indi-
viduals solely defined by monetary wealth will be prone
to various opposing interests, conflicts and contradic-
tions. On the other hand, the present accumulation pro-
cesses – a mixture of classical capital valorisation and
‚accumulation by dispossession’4 – produce social and
cultural integration effects of their own within those
money elites.
Because of its many transatlantic ties the European
money elite will most likely model itself after the US-
plutocracy as it was described by Ferdinand Lundberg
many years ago: „Super-wealth simply consists of a
very large generic fortune that may or may not be split
into several parts. It has other characteristics: First, it
generally controls and revolves around one or more
important banks. It absolutely controls or has a control-
ling ownership stake in from one to three or more of the
largest industrial corporations. It has established and
controls through the family one to three or four or more
super foundations designed to achieve a variety of sta-
ted worthy purposes as well as confer vast industrial
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2control through stock ownership and extend patronage-
influence over wide areas. It has established or princi-
pally supports one or several major universities or lea-
ding polytechnic institutes. It is a constant heavy
political contributor, invariably to the Republican Party,
the political projection of super-wealth, It has extreme-
ly heavy property holdings abroad so that national, for-
eign and military policy is of particular interest to it.
And it has vast indirect popular cultural influence
because of the huge amount of advertising its corporati-
ons place in the mass media.“5
What does it mean ‚to own’ something? As long as we
ask who owns a home, a shop, a painting etc., our laws
are quite specific. But who owns a corporation, the Ger-
man railroad system, the port of Rotterdam etc.? Esta-
blishing ownership in these instances becomes quite
complicated and eventually leads to private sharehol-
ders. And ownership of these assets - including public
(state, community) property and societal property
(water, nature etc.) - will eventually concentrate in the
hands of a few families and individuals. But then we
have to go one step further: questions like ‘who owns a
country’ or ‘who owns Europe’ have not been asked
since the demise of feudalism.
Could it be that we are not dealing with ‘ownership’ at
all, but rather with ‘usurpation’? Fifteen years after the
EU-treaty of Maastricht the inner workings of the nati-
on state, the laws governing ownership and the policies
of distribution have deeply changed. There are new
structures of power and decision-making evolving that
have little to do with democracy. Neoliberal ideology is
sweeping away a whole system of governance that the
bourgeois-capitalist society of yesteryear had establis-
hed.6 Status and class privileges established within the
‘old’ system are turning into mere instruments for the
accumulation of money. Corruption has become syste-
mic. All this is a historically new type of regime.
This is no case of ‘primitive accumulation’ – and at the
same time it is. We hear echoes of the absolutist state.
"The public debt becomes one of the most powerful
levers of primitive accumulation. As with the stroke of
an enchanter’s wand, it endows barren money with the
power of breeding and thus turns it into capital, without
the necessity of its exposing itself to the troubles and
risks inseparable from its employment in industry or
even in usury."7 Public debt has turned into one of the
core strategies of Neoliberalism. Michel Chossudovsky:
“The global banks decide on what constitutes a ‘political-
ly correct’ economic agenda. The new ‘financial architec-
t u r e ’ is to be based on the removal of all remaining bar-
riers to capital movements ... More generally, the tendency
is toward a system of ‚private regulation’ (under the direct
control of banks and MNCs) in which governments and
i n t e rgovernmental bodies would play a subsidiary role. In
other words, the stranglehold of creditors over the State
apparatus in all major regions of the world (including
North America and Western Europe) is conducive to the
development of a private sector bureaucracy which over-
sees activities previously under State jurisdiction.“8
What kind of capitalism are we talking about then?
Since the 1970s, two fundamental changes have been
made in the leading (American) model of capitalism.
The first is that the ‘stakeholder’, post-New Deal refor-
med version of capitalism that prevailed in the West
after World War II was replaced by a new model of cor-
porate purpose and responsibility. The earlier model
said that corporations had a duty to ensure the well-
being of employees, and an obligation to the communi-
ty. That model has – secondly – been replaced by one in
which corporation managers are responsible for creating
short-term ‘value’ for owners, as measured by stock
valuation and quarterly dividends. “The practical result
has been constant pressure to reduce wages and worker
benefits (leading in some cases to theft of pensions and
other crimes), and political lobbying and public persua-
sion to lower the corporate tax contribution to govern-
ment finance and the public interest. - In short, the
system in the advanced countries has been rejigged
since the 1960s to take wealth from workers, and from
the funding of government, and transfer it to stockhol-
ders and corporate executives.”9.
A huge propaganda effort is under way to promote the
project of an Ownership Society: „We Conservatives
have always passed our values from generation to gene-
ration. I believe that personal prosperity should follow
the same course. I want to see wealth cascading down
the generations. We do not see each generation starting
out anew, with the past cut off and the future ignored.“10
And the Cato Institute tells us how: „Individuals are
empowered by freeing them from dependence on gover-
nment handouts and making them owners instead, in
control of their own lives and destinies. In the owners-
hip society, patients control their own health care,
parents control their own children's education, and wor-
kers control their retirement savings.“11
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3„No time for losers“ headlines The Economist explai-
ning the theory of Wealth Condensation12, according to
which new wealth always accrues disproportionately
high with individuals already wealthy: “In certain jobs,
the market pays individuals not according to their abso-
lute performance but according to their performance
relative to others. The income of window cleaners
depends upon how many windows they clean, but
investment bankers’ pay may depend upon their perfor-
mance ranking. Slightly more talented window cleaners
will make only a small difference ... but in the markets
for selling bonds that slight edge can mean everything.
Rewards at the top are therefore disproportionately
high, and rewards below the top are disproportionately
low ... In a normal market, sumptuous superstar inco-
mes would attract competition from more applicants to
do the jobs that pay them. This would then bring sala-
ries down to less exotic levels. In a winner-takes-all
market, this does not happen. An investment bank wants
the best analysts and dealers; second best will not do. It
can also afford to pay. Some economists believe that
because of more liberalized markets there will be gro-
wing inequality in most professions and the emergence
of a winner-takes-all society.”13
Empirical impressions regarding the
development of wealth
The statistics of wealth can deceive, as this anecdote cited
by Paul Krugman shows: A liberal and a conserv a t i v e
w e re sitting in a bar. Then Bill Gates walked in. - "Hey,
w e ' re rich!" shouted the conservative. "The average per -
son in this bar is now worth more than a billion!" –
"That's silly," replied the liberal. "Bill Gates raises the
average, but that doesn't make you or me any richer." –
"Hah!" said the conservative, "I see you're still practicing
the discredited politics of class warfare . "1 4
There are two reports on wealth and poverty published
by the German government15, there is a German Wealth
Report 2000 by Merrill Lynch, but no comparable Bri-
tish, Italian, French etc. reports and no European Wealth
Report exist. On the other hand, large investment banks
and Wealth Management firms command over internal
data bases on their wealthy clientele. The global nature
of wealth development is captured by Merrill Lynch’s
World Wealth Reports.16
According to the Merrill Lynch World Wealth Report
2006 the wealth of high net worth individuals (HNWIs)
with net financial assets of at least 1 million US-dollar,
excluding their primary residence and consumables,
climbed to 33.3 trillion US-dollar in 2005, an 8.5 per-
cent increase over 2004. In other words, the number of
HNWIs grew by 6.5 percent over 2004, to 8.7 million,
and the number of Ultra-HNWIs – those who have
financial assets of more than 30 million US-dollar –
grew by 10.2 percent, to 85,400 in 2005. 
In Europe the portion of ‘wealthy’ households grew by
8 percent, the portion of ‘affluent’ households remained
stable and the ‘mass market’ decreased by 6 percent.
Wealth concentration in Europe focused on five coun-
tries – Germany, UK, France, Italy, Spain – represen-
ting, according to UBS, 80 percent of the European
investment market.17
The creation of wealth was slowing somewhat in many
regions of the world – most notably, North America –
but HNWIs “were still able to benefit from pockets of
high performance”. One area where HNWIs found sig-
nificant opportunity was in the Asia Pacific region.
Latin America and the Middle East also exhibited strong
growth. The HNWI population grew most dramatically
in South Korea, rising 21.3 percent; India rising 19.3
percent; Russia, where it rose 17.4 percent, and South
Africa, where it grew by 15.9 percent.
Europe retained 22 percent of HNWIs’ w o r l d w i d e
assets because of strong performance by Europe’s matu-
re capital markets. Local HNWIs increased their alloca-
tion to domestic markets to 48 percent, up from 40 per-
cent in 2004. But it is also expected that their
investments in North America and Europe will continue
to decline over the next few years as HNWIs reallocate
funds to Asia Pacific and Latin America.18
How then not only to quantify, but also to give a ‘face’
to the profiteers of the neoliberal transformation of
Europe, to the European Ultra-HNWIs? It is not easy.
The Sunday Times, for example, has been quite creative
in accumulating ranking lists of Europe’s Richest and of
UK’s wealthy, coming up with lists like: The 20 fastest
growing fortunes, The Sunday Times Giving Index,
Top 30 political donors / Top 20 political lenders, The
richest women, Millionaires in film and TV, Music mil -
lionaires, Football millionaires, Online millionaires,
Goldman Sachs millionaire s etc. And the S u n d a y s
Times, by publishing its ‚rules of engagement’, has even
cleared the road for grassroots research. 
Here are some of the hints for ‘spotting the superrich’:
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4than our figure ... We measure identifiable wealth,
whether land, property, racehorses, art or significant
shares in publicly quoted companies. We exclude bank
accounts – to which we have no access ... Many indivi-
duals in the list have generated their personal wealth
from the sale of successful businesses. In valuing them,
we have to take account of the tax paid on the sale pro-
ceeds and have taken professional advice from tax
experts ... Private companies, and therefore stakes in
them, are valued on the basis of their most recently
reported pre-tax profits less a notional tax charge, mul-
tiplied by the relevant price-earnings (p/e) ratio. We
usually name and picture the leading family member to
represent the whole family’s interests ... Family trusts
are also aggregated and included. We have distinguis-
hed between trusts held on behalf of family members
and charitable trusts, which are not included ... Land is
valued on what and where it is: Most valuable is Lon-
don land with planning permission, other urban land,
good farming, forestry, poor farming and, finally, deso-
late land, shooting and fishing rights, estimates of agri-
cultural land values ... The art treasures have been
valued by an expert who wishes to remain anonymous
... Many new private companies run by millionaire
owners have been unearthed this year through the sophi-
sticated computerized searches and analysis of company
accounts and directors’ shareholdings ... We have used a
large network of local correspondents. We offer special
thanks to our man who knows the car dealers and has
extraordinary knowledge of the rich in general ... Any-
body with suggestions for names that could be included
in future can write in confidence to ...”19
Still, these big fish traverse the oceans of their societies
largely undetected. Their actual wealth and income
situations are hardly open to sound empirical-statistical
analysis. And because of their comparatively limited
number national statistical surveys usually ‘forg e t ’
them.
The networks of the ‘monetary power complex’ combi-
ne entrepreneurial ownership operations, the generation
of income from multiple other sources (especially, of
course, the financial markets), revenues stemming from
inheritance, dispossession, crime etc. And at the centre
of this system, industrial property – small and large
companies – is being converted into flexible and fluid
assets. Eventually these assets can be broken up, sold in
parts, rearranged etc. Right now, doing business with
these ‚fluidified’ industrial assets is creating the largest
revenues. These accumulation processes are supported
by a ‘wealth management industry’ of ever growing
complexity.
In addition, the superrich are applying their consumpti-
ve power in order to secure their socio-cultural status.
By practicing conspicuous consumption (first described
by Thorstein Veblen20), the money elite not only demon-
strates their elevated position, but also focuses all other
classes on very specific notions of happiness, thereby
discrediting alternative possibilities of ‘self-fulfilment’,
solidarity etc.
In Europe in particular we find many telling examples
of luxury consumption – from the agglomeration of
luxurious real estate to the production of luxury cars and
private jets. The sale of megayachts is booming, their
sizes increasing, their purchase prices and upkeep rea-
ching astronomical heights. These residences, yachts
etc. serve as an ambience in which to interact, ‚bond’
and create dependencies (cf. the ‘adventures’ of Tony
Blair, José Barroso or Nicolas Sarkozy in this wonder-
land).21
Cultural capital, too, is being increasingly monetarised.
Elite universities, essentially reserved for the children
of the rich, will allow a selection of the ‘best and brigh-
test’ from other social classes to study on scholarships
to fill the better service jobs. All other young people
striving for a better education have to get into debt.
American graduates by now leave their universities with
an average student loan debt of 19 000 US-dollars. And
in Great Britain “politicians are becoming concerned
that if the specter of debt leads young people to view
higher education as a luxury not worth pursuing, their
nations' competitiveness will suffer.”22
In the final analysis, though, cultural capital is not a
matter of individual careers. The truly wealthy create
networks of culture and knowledge for themselves,
which mirror the court culture of aristocratic societies.
They surround themselves with ‘entourages’ of educa-
ted, cultivated, specialized counsellors, court jesters etc.
All these formal and informal intellectual commodities
will enhance and adorn the rich as a class. And the
‘monetary power complex’ itself will only function pro-
perly if it is lifted to a higher cultural level as a whole.
This is what all the talk about a new ‘ethics of wealth’ -
institutionalised in foundations, think tanks etc. –
implies. The Gates Foundation itself is financing a study
which is to "provide a window into the cultural horizons
of wealth and can directly help wealth holders use their
resources as a tool for nobler purposes into the 21st cen-
tury.”23
The social capital of the money elite must be seen in a
similar light. In Europe, without doubt, an individual’s
19 The Sunday Times Rich List, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/
section/0,,29049,00.html; Rules of Engagement, http://business.
timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,20589-2132606,00.html
20 Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, 1899
21 For observing the superrich while playing and bonding cf. the
excellent Weblog ‚The Wealth Report’ by WSJ-author Robert
Frank, http://blogs.wsj.com/wealth/
22 Holly Hubbard Preston, ‘Higher education: Priced out of reach?’,
IHT, June 30, 2006
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5habitus, as acquired in familial and transfamilial set-
tings, plays an important part in all selection and ran-
king processes leading to a successful career: „The cri-
teria for filling leadership positions in German
corporations do not derive from any merit system, but
from the class-specific habitus of the candidates. This
pertains to a self-assured presence that will signalise to
the ‚insiders’ whether someone ‚belongs’ or not.“24 On
the other hand, social competence of this sort must not
necessarily be attached to an individual. He who can
afford ‘social coaches’, image counsellors or just body-
guards is in command of lots of social capital, even if he
is a stuttering introvert. 
Some operations of wealth
concentration
Wealth creation and preservation require that various
types of assets and capital be set in motion. The follo-
wing operations within the ‘monetary power complex’
can be distinguished: a) privatisation as that type of pro-
perty operation that in the final analysis establishes the
money elite as a new sovereign25; b) the established ope-
rations of valorisation (capital) and ‘accumulation by
dispossession’ within the capitalist system; c) operati-
ons of value distribution (here: from the ‘bottom’ to the
‘top’); d) operations of informatisation which – through
communication and ‘interpretation’ – facilitate the ope-
rations of privatisation, valorisation and distribution.
Privatisation in all its forms stabilizes the ‘monetary
power complex’. Turning ‘everything’ into private pro-
perty is, on one hand, based on age-old practices of
greed fulfilment. On the other hand, the mechanisms of
the knowledge and information society have increased
the range and intensity of privatisation practices to
unheard-of levels. Privatisation has, in fact, reduced the
extent of privacy for the masses, while enhancing the
privacy of the few. Very few people retain the privilege
of self-determination, i.e. the privilege of privacy.
Those few individuals, by definition, are the superrich.
By becoming more and more ‘private’, they begin to
honestly believe that they ‘own’ and control the world –
and that their philanthropic efforts suffice to justify the
status quo.26 This is their claim to sovereignty, boosted
by operations like self-representation, autonomisation,
usurpation of privileges and leadership positions,
exploitation of non-profit-organizations, philanthropy,
creation of security zones etc. 
In contrast, operations of distribution still require par-
liaments, governments, laws and the legal system. But
this political sphere, through lobbyism and subventio -
nism, is more and more falling prey to privatisation, too.
The contradictions between public and private forms of
ownership increase and every attempt is made to resol-
ve these contradictions in the interest of the ‚monetary
power complex’. A tight net of influence peddling spans
the economic and the political spheres, including syste-
mic corruption. We only can emphasize here that all
problems of distribution are still hinged to the rules of
taxation and their enforcement. This then is a pivotal
field for political analysis and action.
But maybe even more important is the fact that the
‘monetary power complex’ is based on the new technolo-
gies of i n f o r m a t i s a t i o n. „Postmodernization and the pas-
sage to Empire involve a real convergence of the realm
that use to be designated as base and s u p e r s t ru c t u re.
Empire takes form when language and communication,
or really when immaterial labor and cooperation, become
the dominant productive force ... The s u p e r s t ru c t u re i s
put to work, and the universe we live in is a universe of
productive linguistic networks.“2 7 The operations of valo-
risation are on all levels determined by the informatisati-
on process: industrial means of production (automation),
financial transactions and labour. And above everything,
informatisation leads to new forms of control and sur-
veillance: „I recall the visit with a friend who heads a
l a rge investment firm in New York. He showed me count-
less columns of numbers on a large computer screen and
explained: ‘We manage billions of dollars and we know
exactly where each and every cent is located this very
minute. We do not rely on any kind of reports, we can see
with our own eyes what is happening in real time.’“2 8
Informatisation has even brought new problems and cont-
radictions to the ‘monetary power complex’ itself. It has
grown vulnerable in a very specific sense. This became
apparent when it was revealed that under a secret Bush
administration program counter-terrorism officials had
gained access to financial records from a vast internatio-
nal database – the Society for Worldwide Interbank
Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) in Belgium – that
routes about 11 million transactions and 6 trillionUS-
dollar daily between banks, brokerages, stock exchanges
and other institutions worldwide2 9 O fficials from the
CIA., the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agen-
cies were allowed to examine tens of thousands of finan-
cial transactions. Basically all customers' names, bank
account numbers and other identifying information could
have been retrieved – and many probably were.
24 Michael Hartmann, ‚Macht muß gelernt sein. Die Rekrutierung
der deutschen Wirtschaftselite ist keine Frage der Leistung’, Junge
Welt, 19.9.03 
25 On the problem of sovereignty cf. M.Hardt/A.Negri, Empire, Har-
vard University Press, 2000
26 cf. Thomas Druyen, Goldkinder. Die Welt des Vermögens, Ham-
burg 2007
27 Hardt/Negri, Empire, p.385
28 Richard Sennett, ‚Das Diktat der Politmanager’, Freitag 32,
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6Such high-tech spy activities always produce valuable
information beyond the stated purpose. This is how the
American ‘monetary power complex’ demonstrated that
Europe’s wealth, for example, is not under total control
by Europe’s wealthy. No one should be so naive as to
think that the war on terror just is a ‘war on terror’. It
also provides, as in the SWIFT-case, ample opportunity
to further the interests of American finance capital
against Islamic, Arabic, Asian and – in the final analysis
– European finance capital. 
The actors of the ‘monetary power
complex’
Already during Clinton’s reign, William Pfaff stated that
“the most significant transformation in our times has
been the growing importance of money in America’s
political system. This role was never slight, but a new
dimension was added when the Supreme Court ruled
that money that was spent on election candidates and on
the furtherance of private and commercial interests is an
expression of free opinion protected by the Constituti-
on. This turned a representative republic into a plu-
tocracy“.30
We live, according to Giovanni Arrighi, in a US-domi-
nated phase of financial expansion, in which “an expan-
ded mass of money capital (m’) sets itself free from the
commodity form, and accumulation proceeds through
financial deals (as in Marx’s abridged formula mm’).”31
Today, this phase of financial expansion is bolstered by
‘scientification’ and ‘informatisation’. These processes
have a profound effect on how power in general and
monetary power in particular are exercised. This is
prompted by extremely cheap computer power and the
development of statistical techniques for drawing con-
clusions from large amounts of economic and social
data, economic interests can scrutinize society, consu-
mers etc.32 This has boosted the number and the qualifi-
cations of the various managerial elites tremendously,
but – contrary to the expectations of Daniel Bell33 – no
‘rule of technocrats’ has arisen. On the contrary: the
managerial elites have turned into a new service class,
functioning – in the last instance (see below) – at the
bidding of the money elite.
The money elite, on the other hand - during the present
cycle of financial expansion - embodies the liberation of
huge amounts of money and their transformation into
‘pure power’. This basically is a very old phenomenon
based on the fact that money simply is ‘what money
does’. In that sense the superrich, constituting a class of
their own, are ‘capable of everything’. All possibilities
of the knowledge and information society are at their
disposal. And so, by means of the ‘monetary power
complex’, a new centre of gravity of (post)modern
society is coming into existence. Encircling this core
structure (and its actors) additional ‘rings’ can be ima-
gined, inhabited by functional elites implementing the
workings of the ‘monetary power complex’, serving it
and owing their existence to it. 
In this model – and it is just a model – the ring closest
to the core (the money elite) would be populated by the
corporate and financial elites, the chief executive offi-
cers of the various industrial and business sectors. These
groups function as the top specialists of capital valori-
sation, as explorers and creators of opportunities for fur-
ther accumulation etc. Some of these CEOs – but sur-
prisingly few – may rise to the ranks of the true money
elite (as is the case, right now, with a number of hedge
fund managers). But measured by their assets they cer-
tainly would be among the HNWIs or UHNWIs. Status-
wise, though, they remain members of a service class,
since they can be fired or demoted – which is something
the truly superrich would never have to face.34 CEOs,
forced into loyalty by their true masters, cooperate or
compete amongst themselves, and it is hard to detect a
common strategic awareness amongst them. In that
sense, they are the ‘true’ capitalists, tied to the economic
profit principle and nothing else.
30 William Pfaff, International Herald Tribune, December 6, 1999;
cf. also Kevin Phillips, Wealth and Democracy, New York 2002
31 Giovanni Arrighi, ‘Hegemony Unravelling - 2’, New Left Review
33, May/June 2005, p. 4
32 Diane Coyle, ‘Big ideas – Our economies are no longer autistic’,
New Statesman, July 26, 2004
33 Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, New York
1973
34 cf. Ferdinand Lundberg, The Rich and the Superrich
 
The next ring houses what might be called the specia-
lists for the distribution of societal wealth. This is the
turf of the political elite. In the eyes of the ‘monetary
power complex’ all parliaments, all governments have
just one function: distributing wealth from the ‘bottom’
to the ‘top’ without endangering the social consensus. 
7The space of the political elite is severely affected by
lobbyism and corruption and therefore a highly diffe-
rentiated and conflictualised field. A few members of
the political elite (especially ‘ex-politicians’) may rise
to the level of the HNWIs, but the chances of joining the
money elite are nearly nil (exceptions like the Bush clan
affirm the rule).
Finally, the vast outer ring is the home of technocrats
and experts (analytical, symbolic and affective) indi-
spensable to the functioning of the ‘monetary power
complex’. ‘Rankings’ and evaluations determine the
usefulness of these ‘knowledge elites’ with regard to the
economic, social and cultural interests of the money
elite. Some members of this group can also rise to the
ranks of the HNWIs or UHNWIs – but not higher
(exceptions like the dot-com-billionaires again affirm
the rule). 
The French sociologist Mattei Dogan has used a similar
ring model in analysing the elite configuration in Fran-
ce.35 He has raised the important question whether and
how the number of members of each of these groups
could be calculated. Depending on one’s perspective,
the numbers for the knowledge elite – whether with
regard to Europe or to a single country – can go into the
millions, the numbers for the political elite can go into
the hundred thousands, the numbers for the corporate
elite into the ten thousands and the numbers for the
money elite into the thousands. But in the final analysis
what is interesting and relevant is the fact that – within
a winner-takes-all-system – the ranking game plays a
decisive role. Therefore, in order to grasp the ‘essence’
of these groups, it is entirely acceptable to deal with just
the ‘top hundred’ or so of each group. They may be
quantités négligables in a statistical sense, but they ade-
quately represent the profiteers and the ‘sub-profiteers’
(the profiteering service classes) of the ‘monetary
power complex’.
With regard to the European elite configuration
some additional questions should be posed. What about
the inheritance of positions of power? What role do
bureaucracies play? Is there really something like an
iron curtain between the money elite and the other eli-
tes? And what function does the practice of ranking wit-
hin the ‘monetary power complex’ really have?36
As far as the question of inheritance is concerned, all
observers37 seem to have concluded that one has to
differentiate sharply between positions of monetary
power (capital ownership) and all other positions of
power (managers, technocrats, politicians, intellectuals
etc.). The first group has a well established system for
transmitting their positions to the next generation, the
second group has not. Within the money elites in the US
and Europe ‘cousinhood’ plays an important role. “An
interesting feature is the intermingling by marriage
among the economic elite, and the absence of such an
alliance by intermarriage between the economic elite
and the political elite. Among the owners of capital,
endogamy is widely practiced, and this custom is a sup-
plementary reason for their relative isolation in the elite
configuration.”38 This tendency of dynasty building
modelled after the aristocracy is an essential characteri-
stic of the superrich.
In several European countries – in contrast to the US –
a bureaucratic elite has strongly influenced the elite
configuration. In Germany they have contributed to the
nationalsocialist regime39, in France the enarques provi-
de the backbone of the republic. Dogan even uses the
term ‚republic of the mandarins’40, because the gradua-
tes of elite academies like the École nationale d'admini -
stration (ENA) regard themselves as the ultimate arbi-
ters of state power. And there are reasons to believe that
this kind of self-interpretation might be exported into
the Brussels-bureaucracy as well.
But the most important aspect in understanding the Euro-
pean power elite configuration is the practically insurmo-
untable wall between the money elite and the other elites.
Even top managers, top politicians or top bureaucrats
stand no chance of becoming integrated into these circles.
The money elite lives on another planet. “Among the 100
richest persons in France in 1987 ... none have been
tempted to a political career, and only a handful had a
family connection with a politician. Among the important
politicians of the 1990s, a certain number are relatively
rich, but not among the 500 richest persons in France.
Among the 500 richest entrepreneurs representing, in
many cases, the richest families, one cannot discover
more than a few engineers graduates of the E c o l e
P o l y t e c h n i q u e (15 graduates in 1998). From these merci-
less statistics results a tectonic fissure isolating the capi-
talist elite from the other elite categories.”4 1
But this does not imply, that the ‘capitalist elite’ does
not ‘rule’ – as Dogan seems to think. The money elite,
indeed, does not manage, does not practice everyday
politics, does not create culture. But they have succee-
ded in letting others in their place do these chores. The
various service elites will do the managing, distributing,
power brokering, inventing and even thinking for them
– whilst almost all of the created value will eventually
come to rest at their centre of gravity.
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8There remains the question of ranking, in particular wit-
hin the various ‘service rings’. High rank, almost
always expressed in terms of asset ownership and inco-
me, always points to usefulness for the ‘monetary power
complex’. “A competitive market tends to create a wide
d i fference between the payoffs for ‘winners’ a n d
‘losers’: what we call a ‘winner-take-all’ system. Thus,
with such high stakes depending on every next move,
there is a strong incentive for companies and individu-
als to focus on just winning the next round, i.e., to think
short-term regardless of the impact on the business'
long-term viability.“42 It is exactly this mechanism that
enables individuals and groups (CEOs for example)
who have reached the upper echelons to secure higher
and higher payoffs, whilst those just below them fall
back disproportionately. Therefore ranking-lists are clo-
sely watched, for they point to the best service person-
nel where money accumulation is concerned.
Putting the superrich and their
‘monetary power complex’ into
perspective
So, apart from the money elite, our attention should be
focused on the knowledge elites, the political elites and
especially on the managerial and financial elites – who as
of late have been demanding something like ‘global cor -
porate statesmanship’ .4 3 European executives – and this
might be a starting point for research and political action
– have become less inhibited about asking for A m e r i c a n -
style compensation. ‘Here in France, greed has been lega-
l i z e d , ’ says the head of a French investment firm.4 4
And even more interesting is the fact that the relations-
hip between potent investors (the money elite) and the
managerial class is increasingly strained. An advisor to
rich Arab investors writes of the managerial elite: “The
people running these gigantic global corporations are all
part of a tiny club, leaving the ordinary investor hanging
out to dry ... They fly on private jets paid for by sha-
reholders and are given private booths at major games
and shows ... There is a foul smell in the corporate
boardrooms of the world's largest companies and a huge
shareholder revolt is building up ... But what is more
important here is that these practices are becoming a
menace to the global economy ... It is time for the
wealthy, like the Arabs who have hundred of billions of
their money invested in these big companies, to ask
their bankers some tough questions. Where is my
money, and what are you doing with it?”45 And the
managers in return will probably ask: And on what are
you billionaires squandering your wealth?
For us, the answer to many of these questions lies in
Power Structure Research (PSR).46 This movement of
researchers and activists – quite well established in the
United States – is primarily concerned with: the unequal
distribution of resources upon which power is based
(wealth, political office, control of the mass media); the
importance of formal and informal social networks as
the means by which power is concentrated and institu-
tionalised. Power Structure Research is carried out by
social scientists, investigative journalists; watchdog
groups; political parties and candidates; social move-
ment activists; trade union organizers etc.
One famous example of the results of PSR is Wi l l i a m
D o m h o ff’s model of policy-formation: Strategic decision
making usually begins informally in corporate board-
rooms, social clubs, and discussion groups where problems
are identified as ‚issues’ to be solved by new policies. It
ends in government, where policies are enacted and imple-
mented. In between, however, there is a complex network
of people and institutions that play an important role in
sharpening the issues and weighing the alternatives. T h i s
network has three main components - foundations, think
tanks, and policy-discussion groups. And all of these com-
ponents are constantly lubricated by the flow of $$.4 7
There are lots of contradictions and elements of futu-
re development to explore within the money elite, its
supporting cast and within the ‘monetary power
complex’ as a whole. The service classes of ‘capita-
lism-based high-tech-refeudalisation’ – the knowled-
ge elites, the political directorates, the managerial
and financial elites – are caught in that ‘tectonic fis-
s u re’(Dogan) isolating them from the superrich.
They are increasingly unsure about their loyalties,
they generate whistleblowers and dropouts with a
mission. Many of them are willing to listen to intelli-
gent arguments from the Left. And, of course, even
the superrich are open to reason. All this provides
opportunities for political action and for strategies
on behalf of the people of Europe and towards an
‘ownership society’ of an entirely different design.
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